Nuc Superiority

(= public mind)

Hardware: a) a motive + rationale for
fast demobilization after WW II
and for avoiding UMT: 247

(b) a "necessity" caused by above

(c) a basis, + rationale (despite "SU
threat") for supporting mility + econ
aid with the domestic Movement
(= early '47) Fostered. 278

Thus, a fusion of econ stability – for US, + allies
(our $, new Kool, massive intel...

AVOID GOV SPENDING, INFLATION/
DEPRESSION

[1948 as failure of Atomic (small numbers)
Deterrence/Containment: Cyprus, Berlin, VN;
China.

Thrust:
(d) Berlin '48 (261): alternative to either
Mobilization or Withdrawal. (Air-lift – which could
have been contained by Sovs – backed by Threat (bluff?
After all, the bombs did exist, = US; was Sov willing to war?)
of ES.

- need to step down budget, avoid inflation.
(Forrestal, Nst, C. Johnson)

Superiority

(e) FS required for victory over SU + Europe

(f) FU/FS required to avoid giving up ME in war
(and most of Western Europe!)

(g) Premium on pre-emption (both vs. cities + CF)

as of '48-49:

(b) Heart of US frontier & West Europe (+ ME)!

267-8 Nothing else permitted the overrun.
(Baruch! "When once we outlaw that, there is nothing to stop the Russian advance." *

(+Combat) + ME) - indispensable
- US cannot forego, even bilaterally.

Forrestal, Feb '49, 289

bomb
or Superiority!

- US cannot halt in Rome, even bilaterally
(once SU approaches parity: 1963-64?!
Jeffries

- US cannot allow "de-legitimation
or NFU or Ban

(c) (Stop) US may restrain SU from hitting cities (Amos 278) but permits US to do so! (USAF)

* Did this attitude ever change?

(j) Base (+ Europe) a replacement for NATO (or, for UMT): and changes

- willingness of US military to contemplate starting the war (though not "aggression" or "prevention" — i fear of "provocation" — which need not mean to war or violence!)

Thus: how will others ('use' bomb? - future (and/or US)

i.e. what is "prob" of FU - future?
or threats

- Sovs, as they have got bomb
- Others
- Future US Presidents

- In light of our (my) knowledge of US use
- In light of this knowledge

- Thin continuation of wars, aggression (less stigma), threatening.
- Thin more usable weapons (N-bomb...).
- In absence of agreed restraints, sanctions
- Thin prolif.

(vs. this war)

But! diffnt history of other wpt
- strat bombing
- Service roles
- past superiority / Monopoly
- domestic opinion

and diffnt world environment.

(including superiority wpt Soviet forces, Intelligence for other.

How will all 'use':
- AFTER PROLIF. AND SEVERAL NUC WARS?
(and domestic "adjustment" to these)

- Till '49, "deterrence" meant only Type II — vs SU manpower. (280)

- Till '49, the concept of "FU" + "FS" had NO meaning! but 'use of nucs' (by US)
(Really, true till early '50's: 53? 54?
Only US could "take the initiative"; ⊗

Even then,
- Extreme vulnerability of weapons was significant only for the side that could contemplate striking first.

- Thus: Who would Pres/USG 'use' nuclear weapons? How? Against what?

- Note: - Production + development, 1945 ('44) - 50
(- decision on H)
- Early plans
vs. "Walzer" - 'Motives' for above: as reflected
a) in memos, statements at time
b) in analyses, arguments
c) in "objective factors," + intents, aims...

- Actual "use" — in threats, demos
- History of strat bombing, + of USAF Doctrine: for HE, + nucs

p. 223

Q 3 weeks after Hiroshima, JCS reject NFU

Hewlett

p. 199, 243n Oct 25, 1945 20 SU cities

(All Powers) 213 early '46 SAC created (Aug 27 bombers for A-bomb for 46 p. 373

~12 bombers

p. 241 start '48: 33 bombers

(6 – 24 bombers till early '48

5/yr prod.

198 Aug 23, 1946 Leahy: "sufficient force ... short range period ... vs. major cities ... a complete collapse would end the war.

(see also June '47 226)

Leahy asked for war plan vs. SU

219 June 1946 – theoretical plan, Pincher 20 cities, 50 bombs p. 200

(not practicable till '48.

228 Aug 47 Broiler cities, C+C

229 Oct 47 JSSC requirement: 400 A-bombs, for 100 targets

233 end '47: still no war plan based on actual US mil. cap

Feb 48 – breakthrough = bomb design – could double arsenal (boosted?) (maybe 50 bombs by then)

fall '48 – still not enough trans to assemble 100 bombs for a single attack (24 hrs, 2 days, 1 bomb)

end '48 ≤ 100 bombs

60



Herken
9 Oct 87

Pentagon Office of the Historian
OSD

* The "Marshall–Steinbruner Study" on "US (?) Strat Forces" will be declassified in December.

Feb 14 – St. Valentine's Day (Massacre)

[send to Herken: Gallagher
Thompson
(Ball...

Graham memo
(SR

DE memo on McN/SAC

Marshall – Peter Scoville, and Ed Proctor

Wilson: 60-61 200 sub weapons for deterrence
McN bought this, early on;
Kaufman "talked McN out of "finite deterrence"

10,000 NATO warheads – Powers
1000 McN

200
30
6,000

Kaysen

Harriman: 1st in Memoirs (2d vol. years of Trial 1953

(see Nuclear Barons

says "They still don't have it, or may" — probably (still) (assume) assuming we still had a preclusive monopoly.

K's memoirs:

(This explosion replicates ours;

speculation — may have gone to H because of limits on uranium supply.

don't think.

[Paul Braeden] (Hudson) US had yearly 7 assembled in late '48. (Rowny: 12)

(JCS didn't know Trib April '47 how many we had).

Thomas: did not know SU would have access to Saxony (East Germany).

-but they did not have it in SU.

GH

w H

If debate had assumed Soviet 50 A-bomb, SST... might have decided against (on financial grounds

(Oppie in '51 Chap. 5 of Vista Report recommendation that fissionable material should be divided 3 ways: Tac weps, H-bomb, strat bombs

Nitze + Teller claim that Oppie consciously lied about Tac weps: over-rated effectiveness (yield) and under-rated the materials needed (diameter from strat + H)

In Nuclear Bazaar
Lord Moran, physician to Churchill
on the Churchill-Churchill
Roosevelt Quebec conversation; He did not reject-



	GW	Regional	"Small" (Terrorist)
5	.01	was .1	7.5
10	.1	.25	
20	.25	.5	~1

(Window of $ late '80's – our MX, etc.
opportunity this '84...

Window of vulnerability

(Herbert Gold story: "The Day Fly Hat Boston"
(about time of Fail Safe)

Colby: SF Chronicle on getting to stability
from SALT to START
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

Get rid of land-based (Rostow:)
ICBMs (for stability): bilateral.
Some hope Backfire, IRBMs, we abandon
our forward-based systems
(Planes + subs).

Why not assemble bombs?

(Plastics ("barium") moderator deteriorated quickly

See CDI on Broken Arrows: "components...
2 units

Did Office know of purchasing

see Shenin — French Report

McGB said Indian Arrows did not convey that's that

(Lemon at Woodrow Wilson School:
"NSC-68 suppressed" —
but see.
Dan talked to Chinese official, who said
that it was revised and acted on.

Eugene Rostow:

[Forrestal: on Polaris: "needed oil for Army"

Tillman: "For practical purposes, US-SU we had it at same time."

York: feels that our tests of H (Nov '52) helped
Russians get bomb (for classified reasons)

Dec 332 a list that a Kona

333

SU Band Program — Arnold Kroiak

somewhere recently

(Nwc. Barons?)

Dec 399 for 81

Hubert: 1. Were predictions of SU wrong (based on maxima)? Foolish?

387 284 281 326

2. Thompson, was taking of sunspots of U foolish?

3. Was taking based on sufficiency: misled?
Lucas, foolish?

Vs. "Arms Control" (Herken)

US perception: Need/opportunity for global sphere, "Grand Area"; confronted by + political
"Threat": 1) SU "must army"; (2) econ problems of attempting to match SU in troops, either by Europe or US (3) SU "boundless ambitions" (like actual US!) (limited by SU capacity, at first, but leading to...)
(4) SU willingness to help "native" forces in TW, or CP in Europe (another reason for reducing econ burdens of troop build-up)
(5) Vulnerability of ME oil;
(6) Instability in Congo; need to forestall SU from uranium.

→ need for US { monopoly of Bomb / willingness to use Bomb (FC) } (on cities: USAF)
+ credibility of will

Willingness to use Bomb, in face of loss possession (after loss of monopoly) required as much superiority as possible; technological, numbers, dubious: both & total, and CF.

This meant: International Control was unacceptable, first (1945-49) because it

3) might spread loss of Monopoly

(b) might lead to War, loss of Bomb

(c) would inhibit Use: both legally, and psychologically/politically.

Shn, after 1949: in addition to (b) + (c),

(d) might reduce technical superiority.

(e) Would inhibit race for as much Superiority as possible: both legally, and psych/pol (see discussion of CTBT vs. SALT I + II)

Shn (Kilmarthen, late-49, Harder 315): USG never wanted, or could accept, international (or bilateral) control, even if (or espec. if) totally effective on both sides, or any inhibition on our Use or Pursuit of substantially large Superiority

— even on argument that gains we great, but limited, Superiority

(as unacceptable as Parity — or the specter of Inferiority.)

Contrary to PG 6 B, Harder (without his s.t.!) do see Inferiority (even given strong retal. capability) as dangerous + intolerable; but likewise, Parity or Finite Superiority!

Civilian strategists emerge only after H-bomb (Brodie on LW) and in assumption of US-SU parity (or SU superiority!)
(HK - Kaufmann)

[Implicit function: to presume a) rate of build-up, and (b) strategy; reliance on SAC or on arms (HAK, Kahn, Teller) despite these.

Arent CTB (RAND: Big Hole, '57?) ?

Arent NFU? Bar...

Arent "minimum deterrence"?

(Vs. "scientists."
Britain?
(actual SU policy!)

ADW opposed proli, but not (at the time) arms energy, or build-up, nor proposed NFU.
(only Navy?)

SIOP-62 characteristics – go back to earliest plans '47-49.

a) Will to use FS in with range of civ.

2) Conflict between a desire to deter, and a strategy for fighting (+ winning) which emphasized capability + intent to pre-empt [and 'winning' – as an air – strongly points to this!:

unless (OE Plan) it emphasizes "interwar Deterrence": which aims less at Winning than at Stabilizing (not-losing): unless one stresses enormous pre- and post-attack initiation superiority.

(i.e. this is a conflict after SU were exploited to have CF cap.)

all these "conflicts" become apparent by '60; real, after 1967 or '75-80.)

b,c for(3)

CF and Interwar Det. US, with MX + Trident + ASW + civil?)

b) Conflict between desire to "cause surrender" (not "unconditional") and to hit Moscow + Leningrad indirectly. (PD-59) and all other cities (70, i 1948...)

c) Conflict between desire for "political bargaining with" (about being) and desire to offend all weapons indirectly. (286...) (Shock effect, or morale, org, will.) – and war guiding //

Pressure for H-bomb (before and after 1950) must be understood in light of WAF/JCS plans and doctrine, from 1947 on

(and then, in light of practice from early 1945 on, reflecting earlier UK doctrine + practice).

H aimed to answer questions of feasibility (entry; accuracy) and decisiveness (if unlimited or pre-emptive).

IT SERVED TO REPLACE (LOST) MONOPOLY WITH SUPERIORITY, AND SUPERIORITY IN H LOOKED MORE WINNING THAN MONOPOLY OF A WHICH APPEARED BY 1949.

(while intensifying issue — for those who worried about it (Lilienthal; Truman?) of morality.) (289, 282, 286)

ANSWER TO SOVIET TROOP STRENGTH WAS US CAPABILITY AND WILL TO CARRY OUT MASS TERROR BOMBING OF CIVILIANS. (289)

(Vs. all premises of Just War, Laws of War:

(Truman and Churchill strategy!) (Churchill)

ASK NOW: Did/do these have a "realistic, practical" aspect for the long-run survival of "civ", of civ SIOP (JCS) and Colombia/NUN life? "Fences"? (Lilienthal, Jeffers) DE: B-52s, Jet, RT by 1967-69.)

From 1945 to mid-1949 (298), military (USAF) and low-budgeters hoped that A-bomb mediated Strat. Bombing. It did not (in quantities available, deliverability, effects).

But H-bomb did.
(still mid-'60's).

Rather: "Super" (1949-50) did not, yet.
But Teller-Ulam bomb did!

(Does York recognize this difference? After all, GAC comments were on Super, not on "H."

What would they have said of Teller-Ulam bomb? What would be?

In light of actual strategy,
not Tyler I Doctrine! (FU, FS.)

mass, cities, immediate
C+C — will —

Atomic Diplomacy

(Nerken)

See effects of possession of bomb on

(a) negots w/r bomb control

US "critical role" — willingness to

178 break off negots rather than

compromise (or less, agree!

— i.e. desire to see any

control;

— desire to achieve "opening

up of SU" by control ...

(b) US demands

(c) US influences as to meaning of SU

"intransigence" — the refusal to yield

in face of threats, or of (early) possibility

of cooperation ...

i.e. SU rejection of "reasonable" proposals

(see interpretation of NCF "intransigence"

and see efforts a Bargaining of beliefs that

187 – SU couldn't get bombs thru
(in less than 20 years)
– it was a "winning weapon" 189

– Within 10 years, SU must change from within!
(like Kennan)
Delay was vital (i.e. maintenance of US
superiority, non-agreement/legitimizing of terms)

– Belief "we win [i.e. public opinion] even if
negots [bombing: RT!] fails 189
(ultimate)

on H-bomb

Hyp, suggested by Herken with Sanders:

2) Pressure for H-bomb came mid-summer 1949 — before SU A-bomb (Sam Tim Cochran told Jessup — "Russian Sino-Soviet Bloc is to be permitted no further expansion in FE.")

when Pentagon realized that A-bomb wouldn't be decisive — even unilaterally!

b) Need to focus on (2) defense of Europe — (b) US thinks of wars — to justify

(1) US troops in Europe, as means to underlie flow of dollars to Europe: for recovery, and maintenance of US exports, and avoidance of Left Turn in Europe

[and for ME?!]

rationale: tripwire to 1) US involvement

2) US wars — seen as essential, and sufficient

(2) lack of further linkup by Europe, or US

("No need, if deterrence.")

Hence, need for larger A-bombs; — and for H.

(3) SU A-bomb means expansion, and also reinforcing need for H. for A.

In '45 20 city "study."

In '46 cities expanded.

not yet enough weapons!

less than 24 – only 4% – were [illegible] – though 1000 times more powerful than the 10 ton blockbuster – so-called – was not yet a "city-buster" for cities larger than Hiroshima.

By '47 – whole stockpile

'48 Likewise

'49 DP – "capacity" – 400

– "kill a county"

'49-50 70 cities – 133 weapons

Long run goal for SAC; whole stockpile at once "sufficient number will..."

"sufficient: 400 by 53. Met by '51

But was this enough?

USAF confident – '49:

But in May, 1949, Harmon Study cast doubts: not decisive.

JCS

This called for largest possible SAC; but also Douhet principle, bulwind confined – WWII.

After 1949 the target end known "the 5-5 Bloc"

10 years later, this was still true & the JCS strategic war plan, now called the SIOP, called for the

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~~'48~~ Likewise

~~'49~~ D. "required" is 400

— "kill a county"

'49-50 70 cities — 133 weapons

Army set goal for SAC: whole stockpile at once "sufficient number will...

"sufficient: 400 by 53. Met by '51

But was this enough?

USAF confident: / '49:

But in May, 1949, Navy Study cast doubt: not decisive.

JCS

This called for largest possible SAC; but also Dulles principles, declined confined in WWII.

~~During~~ After 1949 the target list known "the 5-5 Box"

10 years later, this was still true & the JCS strategic war plan, now called the SIOP, called for the